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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JAMES D. CHRISTENSEN and
BETTY CHRISTENSEN, his wife,
Plai,ntiff s-Rcs pondents
- vs -

Case No.
11752

HENRY CORDOVA,
Defendant-Appellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
uamage arising out of an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COURT
The case was tried withont a jnry, after a demand
for jury trial was denied, as more completely set forth
in Statement of Facts. During the trial, Plaintiff Jam es
D. Christensen was permitted to add a claim for his
lJersonal injuries, in addition to his claim for property
damage. The Conrt granted Judgment for the Plaintiffs.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
For reasons appearing in thi:::; recital, we are separating the facts into two categories.
MATERIAL FACTS
This suit arose out of an automobile accident wherein
Defendant drove hi:::; car into the rear of the Plaintiffs'
vehicle. Liability was clear, and we need not go into
more detail.
Mr. Christensen sued for property damage only.
Mrs. Christensen sued for personal injuries. The suit
was filed on September 4, 1968 (R-1). Atto111ey Wilde
filed an appearance for the Defendant on October 1,
1968 (R-4).
On October 14, 1968, a Stipulation was filed, signed
by the attorneys of record, and the Defendant, that the
Defendant was uninsured - a peculiar stipulation in a
tort action. On November 25th, a Withdrawal of Counsel
was signed by the Defendant's Attorney, and signed a:::;
received by the Defendant. On the same date, November
25th, a Notice of Readiness for Trial was filed in the
Clerk's office. No mailing certificate is attached indicating any notice was given to the Defendant, but indicating that notice was sent to the withdrawn attorney.
Nothing appears that the Defendant himself was ever
notified, as required by 78-51-36, U.C.A. A doctor's report was attached to the Notice of Readiness for Trial
concerning only the injuries of Mrs. Christensen.
On June 19, 1968, five days before the scheduled
trial, an Appearance wa:::; filed by Defendant's present
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Attorney, and simultaneously therewith, a Demand for
Jury Trial on the date scheduled, or in the alternative,
a Motion for continuance to a later date with a jury trial.
By special agreement between counsel, a hearing was
11eld before the Honorable Bryant Croft, Judge on June
20, 1969. The Court took the matter under advisement,
and requested Plaintiffs' Attorney to file an Affidavit,
and the Affidavit was immediately filed.
(See Stipulation for addition to record on appeal.)
Plaintiffs' Attorney filed an Affidavit (R-13) dated
June 20th which concerned itself only with the actions
of the Insurance Company for Plaintiffs, and its representatives, which affidavit was in opposition to the Motion for a Jury Trial. Not one allegation was made
concerning the actions or omissions of the Defendant
himself. Based upon the Affidavit, the Lower Court
denied the Motion for a Jury Trial.
Trial, accordingly, proceeded without a jury. During the trial, Plaintiffs' Attorney moved to amend the
Complaint in behalf of Mr. Christensen, to include a
claim, for the first time, to a personal injury action,
·which ·was granted, over the objections of Defendant
(R-17).
Judgment was rendered for Plaintiffs as follows:
Betty Christensen-Special Damages ----------$ 998.29
General Damages __________ 5,000.00
James D. Christensen-Special Damages ______ $232.50
General Damages ______ 750.00
Auto Damages __________ 393.64
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IMMATERIAL FACTS
The following facts influenced the Lower Court in
its decisions against the Defendant.
The Plaintiffs were insured under a Liability Policy
containing an Uninsured Motorist Provision. This coverage agrees to pay to the Plaintiffs the amount which
they are legally entitled to recover from an uninsured
motorist. The policy affords absolutely no insurance to
the uninsured motorist. However, the uninsured motorist,
(in this case Mr. Cordova), and the Company have a
common interest - i.e. that the damages awarded be
reasonable for the injuries sustained.
As recited in the Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney,
negotiations for settlement between Plaintiffs' Attorneys
and the insurance company, Reserve Insurance Company,
did not result in a settlement. No notice was given to the
Defendant personally of any of the negotiations, or of
the progress of the suit. No notice was ever given him
to secure counsel, or of the impending trial.
Inasmuch as the Plaintiffs and the Insurance Company could not agree on a settlement, and because of the
imminence of the trial date, Plaintiffs and the Insurance
Company were faced with the following:
1. That Plaintiffs were insistent on proceeding
with the trial, which of course, would have
been a default proceeding.

2. The insurance company, by the terms of the
policy, would not recognize or be bound by a

4

Default Judgment, inasmuch as the1 language
of the policy specifically provided:
"No judgment againt any person or organjzation alleged to be legally responsible for
the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as
between the insured and the company, of
the issues of liability of such person o,r
organization or of the amount of damages
to which the insured is legally entitled;
unless such judgment is entered pursuant
to an action prosecuted by the insured with
the written consent of the company." (See
Stipulation for Addition to Record on
Appeal.)
3. Following the default judgment (had it been
secured by Plaintiffs) a separate suit would
necessarily be required to test the validity of
the judgment, and the defenses under the policy, and the foregoing provision of the policy.
To avoid a multiplicity of suits, and to establish the
legal liability of the uninsured motorist, the Company,
in effect, agreed to a jury trial for that purpose, and to
pay the attorney's fees involved. The Defendant, Mr.
Cordova, was fully advised of the above, and consented
to the arrangement. NO INSURANCE COVERAGE
vVAS PROVIDED HIM, and it was understood in writing that if the Plaintiffs were paid the amount of the
judgment, the judgment would not be satisfied. Further,
the Company reserved the right given by the policy,
to take legal action in the name of the insured to recover
said amount from the Defendant. However, again, the
Defendant and the Company did not have a conflict in
their mutual desire to establish the damages as reasonably as possible.
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For the above reasons, L. E. Midgley, witl1 Defendant's permission, appeared as Attorney for the Defendant
and demanded a jury trial on the same date as the
appearance was filed. The Plaintiffs' Attorneys successfully resisted the motion for a jury trial, and over Defendant's objections a non-jury trial was held.
POINT ONE
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING DEFENDA1\TT A JURY TRIAL.

We fully appreciate the pronouncements of this
Court to the effect that where a demand for jury trial is
not timely made, it is in the sound discretion of the Trial
Court as to whether a belated demand for jury trial
will be granted.

Thomz;son vs. Anderson, 107 Ut. 331, 153 P2d 665.
Hunter vs. Michaelis, 114 Ut. 242, 198 P2d 245.
Webb vs. Webb, 116 Ut. 115, 209 P2d 201.
Farmers and Merchants Bank vs. Universal C.I.T.,
4 Ut.2d 155, 289 P2d 1045.
James Mamtfacturing Company i·s. Wilson, 15
Ut.2d 210, 390 P2d 127.
Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Ut.2d 113, 417
P2d 126.
The true test, we submit, for the Court to consider
in granting or denying a belated demand for jury trial,
is whether excusable neglect on the part of the party
demanding the jury, is shown.
In Thompson vs. Anderson, Supra, this Honorable
Court stated:

6

"Nor is it an abm;e of discretion to fail to
grant a demand for a jury trial when made late,
if no excitse is shown for failure to make a demand
within the time allowed by statute." (Emphasis
ours)
In Farmers cmd Merchants B(J;nk vs. Universal
C.I.T., Supra. this Court again stated:
"Where, as here, no valid excuse for the failure to make the demand timely was offered, there
is no abuse of discretion on the part of the Trial
Court in denying a later demand."
In the instant case, the Defendant was without counon the very day a Certificate of Readiness for Trial
was filed, and even that Notice was not served on the
Defendant personally. He was never notified to secure
counsel. Many months later, the clerk, over the signature
of the Presiding Judge, forwarded a Notice of the trial
date to the Plaintiffs' Attorneys and to the attorney who
had long since withdrawn. That Notice (R-10) in the
last paragraph states:
"This matter is set for a non-jury trial, unleS's
the jury fee has been paid heretofore. If a jury
trial is desired, the statutory fee must be paid no
later than 10 days from the date of this letter,
with notice thereof being served on opposing
counsel."
NO NOTICE OF TRIAL DATE WAS GIVEN
THE DEFENDANT AND A COPY OF THE FOREGOING LETTER WAS NOT FORWARDED TO HIM.
vVhen Defendant's present Attorney filed his Appearance, only six days before the scheduled trial, the
7

Defendant had been without representation by an Attorney for ahnost nine months, during which time, unknown
to him, there was a fight going on in the bleachers
involving an insurance company he probably didn't know'
existed.
vVhen his present Attorney moved for a jury trial
immediately upon his filing the appearance, and upon
argument of the Motion, the Honorable Judge Croft
requested an Affidavit of the Plaintiffs' Attorneys concerning the fight in the bleachers, BUT NO TIME vV AS
GIVEN THE DEFENDANT PERSONALLY to file
a counter affidavit, for the simple reason that no time
was left before the trial date.
Never in the spotty career of the writer, have we
seen first hand such a complete lack of interest of all
parties, including the Court, of the rights of a litigant.
Never have we seen an Affidavit covering absolutely
immaterial actions of a non-litigant used so effectively
in prejudicing the rights of a litigant.
In this case, we are concerned with the Defendant,
Mr. Cordova, and not with Reserve Insurance Company,
who had the unmitigated gall to disagree with Plaintiffs'
Attorneys on the value of Plaintiffs' claim against the
Defendant.
POINT TWO
THE DEFENDANT, BY RECEIPTING HIS ATTORNEY'S NOTICE OF WIT HD RAWAL, IS DEEMED
TO BE APPEARING PRO SE, AND FAIL URE TO
GIVE HIM NOTICE OF ALL SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
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Article I, Sec. 11, Utah Constitution provides:
" ... and no person shall be barred from prosecuting or def ending before any tribunal in the
8tate, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to
which he is a party."
78-51-36, Utah Code Annotated States:
I

\
)
)
/
/
\
.

''NOTICE TO APPOINT SUCCESSOR \Vhen an Attorney dies, or is removed or suspended, or ceases to act as such, a party to an
action or proceeding for whom he was acting as
Attorney must before any further proceedings
are had against him, be required by the adverse
party, by written notice, to appoint another attorney or to appear in verson." (Emphasis added)

\Ve are well aware of this Court's decision in Security Adju.stmeut Burewu, J.nc. vs. West, 20 Ut. 2nd 292,
437 P2d 214, and we agree with Mr. Justice Henriod's
comment in footnote 4 to the effect that the rule is subject to "some legitimate criticism and analysis."
The ''analysis," not considered in the above case, is
clear. When a Defendant "appears" by counsel, the later
withdrawal by his Attorney does not, and cannot alter
the fact that the Defendant has still "appeared" in the
law suit. His Answer to the Complaint denying the
Plaintiffs' allegations is not affected, and remains as
a general denial. By simple subtraction, therefore, when
his Attorney withdraws, the Defendant's "appearance"
if: without counsel, or pro se.
The fact that the Defendant is not schooled in the
niceties of pleading and practice is of no concern. He
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has a constitutional right to be notified of all sub::;ey_uent
developments. If he receives notice of each step in the
litigation, and takes no action, he is properly bound by
the ultimate conclusion of the case.
But if it be the decision of the Security Adjustment
case that it is justice and fair play to completely ignore
the rights of a litigant even though his Attorney has
withdrawn (when his rights should be more closely scrutinized) the facts in the case at bar are clearly distinguishable.
The Notice of Withdrawal of Defendant's Attorney
was signed as received by the Defendant personally. By
that action, he not only acknowledged but consented to
the withdrawal. He also effectively "appeared" individually. Notice of this was given to Plaintiffs' counsel.
The form of his appearance is inunaterial. The law
is interested in justice, not forms. For example, a long
hand note written by a Defendant to the Clerk of thf'
Court, or the Court, in answer to a Swnmons and Complaint served on him, is universally accepted as an effective Answer, even though it does not in any way comply
with the requirements of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Certainly, in that analagous situation, all further
notices and proceedings must be given to the Defendant,
whether or not there is a further requirement that he be
notified to secure counsel.
"\Ve further submit that there is a long standing
custom and practice of the District Courts, and particn-
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larly the Third District, that when an Attorney withdraws, the other party must give notice to the unrepresented party to secure counsel. If he does not, notices
are mailed to him personally.
After his Attorney withdrew, the Defendant was
completely ignored by Plaintiffs' Attorneys and the Clerk
of the Court. The Honorable Presiding Judge sanctioned
those actions denying this Defendant the right to represent himself, if he so chose.
The Defendant, therefore, is entitled to a new trial.
POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY PERMITTED
PLAINTIFF JAMES D. CHRISTENSEN TO ADD A
CLAIM OF PERSONAL INJURIES DURING THE
TRIAL.

Again we are discussing the interests of the Defendant, l\fr. Cordova, and not Reserve Insurance Company,
Plaintiffs' insurer. There is no question that Reserve
was aware of the claim for injuries by Mr. Christensen,
which were advanced after the law suit was started.
But the Defendant, personally, was completely unaware
of such a claim. While he was originally represented by
Attorney \Vilde, no claim for injuries was advanced
either in the Complaint, or otherwise. No Notice was
given him of such a claim until during the progress of
the trial. During the trial, the amendment was objected
to by Defendant, through his Attorney, but the Honorable Trial Judge permitted the amendment and Judgment
was awarded for injuries which Defendant had never
known existed.
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Rule 15 (a) AMENDMENTS, U.R.C.P.
"A part:· ma:· amend his ph ading once as a
matter of co1irse at any fon<:> lwfore a responsive
pleading is servt>d or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is iwnnitted and the
action has not been placed upon tlw trial calendar,
he may so amend it at any time within 20
after it is served. Other1,·ise a party may amend
his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in respon::;e to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the
original pleading or within 10 days after service
of the amended pleading, whichever period may be
the longer, unless the court otherwise orders."
1

Rule 15 (b) AMENDMENTS TO CONFORM TO
THE EVIDENCE, U.R.C.P.
"vVhen issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the parties.
they shall be treated in all respects as if thl'y
had been raised in the pleadings. Such anwndment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidt>nce and to
raise these issues may be mad<· upon motion of
any party at any time, evt>n after judgment; hut
failure so to amend does not affect the result of
the trial of these issues. If Pvidence is objected to
at the trial on the grounds that it is not within
the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to he amendPd wlwn the presentation of the nwrits of the action will be subsPrved tlwreby and the objt>cting party faib to
satisfy the court that the admission of such <'Videnc1c·· would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. 1'he court
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shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to enable
the objecting party to meet such evidence."
In Iljorth vs. Whittenberg, 121 Utah 324, 241 P2d
907 held that the test of whether the Amendment should
be granted, was whether the amendment imported a new
and different cause of action.
Certainly the addition of a new claim for personal
injuries while the trial is in progress, injects a new and
different cause of action, the merits of which create new
and different defenses than to a claim solely for property
damage.
True, Plaintiffs' insurer had been advised of the
claim, as was Defendant's present Attorney. But by the
same token, so were Plaintiffs' Attorneys, who failed to
move for an amendment, as required by the Rules. The
Def end ant had no knowledge of such a claim, and his
rights are at issue here.
The allowance of the amendment, therefore, was
prejudicially erroneous.
Respectfully submitted,
L. E. MIDGLEY
Attorney for DefendantAppellant
702 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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